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PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONSLIABILITY FOR UNAUTHORIZED TREATMENT
I. INTRODUCTION

The scope of this note is limited to indications of various
circumstances which result in liability of the physician or
surgeon for unauthorized treatment. It will indicate different
rules and concepts developed by the courts in dealing with such
problems.
The limitations of such concepts and rules will be shown as
serving to discourage the physician or surgeon from administering treatment under certain conditions.

II. CONSENT
Common law required the patient's consent when authorizing a physician to administer treatment, for the patient was
a conscious participant.1 The underlying principle is that the
unauthorized touching of another's person constitutes a trespass, resulting in liability.2
However, the use of anesthetics has modified the common
law concept of consent. The patient is no longer a conscious
participant in the operation and thus, is unable to give his
consent when it may be required. 3 Today, the commencement
of an operation occurs when the anesthetic is administered or
4
when it takes effect on the patient.
The general rule is that consent of the patient is required
for treatment or surgery. Therefore the physician or surgeon
who administers treatment or operates without the patient's
consent, express or implied, subjects himself to liability2
A. MINORS-The
is required except
stances. Moreover,
other than parents

parent's consent for treatment of a minor
in an emergency or exceptional circumtemporary custody of a child by someone
will not constitute authority necessary to

1. See Bennan v. Parsonnet, 83 N.J.L. 20, 83 Atl. 948 (1912); Kennedy
v. Parrott, 243 N.C. 355, 90 S.E.2d 754 (1956).
2. PROSSER, TORTS § 18, at 82, 83 (2d ed. 1955).
3. McGuire v. Rix, 118 Neb. 434, 225 N.W. 120 (1929); Kennedy v. Parrott, 243 N.C. 355, 90 S.E.2d 754 (1956).
4. See e. g., Bennan v. Parsonnet, 83 N.J.L. 20, 83 Atl. 948 (1912).
5. Chambers v. Nottebaum, 96 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 1957); Rogers v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 119 So. 2d 649 (La. 1960); Bang v. Charles
T. Miller Hospital, 251 Minn. 427, 88 N.W.2d 186 (1958); Nolan v. Kechijian,
75 R.I. 165, 64 A.2d 866 (1949); In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765
(1942).
6. Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (App. D.C. 1941); Zoski v. Gaines, 271
Mich. 1. 290 N.W. 99 (1935); Sullivan v. Montgomery, 155 Misc. 448. 279
N.Y.S. 575 (1935); Moss v. Rishworth, 222 S.W. 225 (Tex. 1920).
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preclude liability for performing an operation.7 The Restatement of Torts takes a more liberal view in reasoning that if
a child is capable of understanding the nature, extent, and
consequences of the treatment or operation, his consent alone
will constitute sufficient authorization although the parents
expressly refuse their consent. That argument has been criticized as overlooking the infancy exception, requiring legal protection for the personal and property rights of minors.' Where
the operation is for the benefit of another person consent by a
minor is not sufficient.' 0
The decisions finding liability where parental consent is
lacking are unnecessarily rigid today. Where the minor is able
to understand the nature and consequences of the treatment,
his consent should suffice; that is, as long as the treatment
is for his own benefit, and is not in the face of an express refusal by his parents.
B.

THE PHYSICIAN

AS LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE

AND GEN-

ERAL AUTHORIZATION-Some courts have considered the phy-

sician as the legal representative of the anesthetized patient if
there is no other person to act in behalf of the patient.1
Such representation applies only to the general lines of treat2
ment agreed upon.'
Another theory advanced is that where a patient has voluntarily submitted to diagnosis and treatment, a general authorization is given the physician. Consequently, the physician's
acts are authorized either expressly or by implication, in absence of evidence to the contrary. 1 3 Finding a general authorization appears usually to result in a decision for the physician.
C. EMERGENCIES AND UNANTICIPATED CONDITIONS-A physician called to attend a person who is injured and requires
prompt medical attention may administer treatment reason4
ably necessary to preserve the life or health of the patient.
The same reasoning is applied where "unanticipated conditions" arise during the course of an authorized operation.
7.
8.
9.

Moss v. Rishworth, 222 S.W. 225 (Tex. 1920).
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 59, comment (a) at 111 (1934).
Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (App. D.C. 1941).

10. Ibid.
11. See e. g., Franklyn v. Peabody, 249 Mich. 363, 228 N.W. 681 (1930);
Bennan v. Parsonnet, 83 N.J.L. 20, 83 Atl. 948 (1912).
12. See e. g., Franklyn v. Peabody, 249 Mich. 363, 228 N.W. 681 (1930).
13. Baxter v. Snow, 78 Utah 217, 2 P.2d 257 (1931).
14. See Pratt v. Davis, 244 Il1. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906); Luka v. Lowrie,
171 Mich, 122, 136 N.W. 1106 (1912); Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104
N.W. 12 (1905) (dictum).
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Thus, in the event of an emergency or unanticipated condition
the physician: (1) has a duty to perform or to do what the
occasion demands without obtaining consent ;15 (2) must act
on his own discretion ;16 (3) where it is impracticable to obtain
consent, may proceed to remedy the condition without consent. 17 It is argued, however, that implied consent under these
circumstances is a fiction' and that in fact the physician is
"privileged" to render treatment.' 9
The area of emergency or unanticipated conditions is the
area of greatest controversy regarding unauthorized treatment. It is submitted that no strict rule should be applied here
and all circumstances should be weighed before assigning liability. Otherwise an injured person or one requring assistance
may not readily receive medical attention.
D. CONSENT FORM-General consent forms have not provided the physician with any substantial measure of protection
against liability. Consent forms have precluded liability usual20
ly when fortified with some other justification for treatment.
A general consent form has been considered to constitute an
authorization so ambiguous as to be completely worthless
since it failed to designate the nature of the operation for
which consent was given. 1 But a signed consent form alone
precluded liability for administration of an anesthetic not otherwise authorized. 2 It has been held that the validity of a
signed consent form can not be determined by the general law
of contracts because of the special physician-patient relationship. 3 Further, a consent form must be signed with complete
4
understanding of the treatment to be performed.
Consent forms may be desirable to indicate the type of
treatment or procedure to be administered. However, unless
the consent form indicates with reasonable particularity the
nature of the treatment to be undergone, it should have no
validity.
15. Danielson v. Roche, 109 Cal. 2d 832, 241 P.2d 1028 (1952); Wheeler v.
Barker, 92 Cal. 2d 726, 208 P.2d 68 (1949); Delahunt v. Finton, 224 Mich.
226. 221 N.W. 168 (1928); Kennedy v. Parrott, 243 N.C. 355, 90 S.E.2d 754
(1956).
16. Pratt v. Davis, 224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906).
17. Sullivan v. Montgomery, 155 Misc. 448, 279 N.Y. Supp. 575 (1935).
18. Kritzer v. Citron, 101 Cal. 2d 33, 224 P.2d 808 (1950).
19. PROSSER, TORTS § 18, at 84 (2d ed. 1955).
20. Danielson v. Roche, 109 Cal. 2d 832, 241 P.2d 1028 (1952).
21. Rogers v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 119 So. 2d 649 (La. 1960).
22. Moore v. Webb, 345 S.W.2d (Mo. 1961).
23. See Moore v. Webb, 345 S.W.2d (Mo. 1961).
24. Keister v. O'Neil, 59 Cal. 2d 428, 138 P.2d 723 (1943).
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E. CONSENT AS A CONTRAT-Another view is that when a
patient weighs the dangers and risks incident to an operation
and consents thereto, he in effect enters into a contract authorizing the physician to operate. 2' Thus a patient may insist
upon strict performance of such contract. 26 Recovery has been
permitted on the basis of breach of contract,27 and for violation of contract as to the manner of operation. 2 Medical treatment has been considered a service, constituting a necessary
9
for which a minor may contract.2
But the idea that a surgical operation can be contracted for
has been held invalidated as a result of anesthetics.3 0 It has
also been argued that such an agreement can not constitute a
contract since there is no specification of what the surgeon
must do. 3 1 Futher, the physician-patient relationship can not
constitute a strict contract, for the patient is under no obligaion to follow the physician's instructions.32
The concept of consent as a contract has usually been employed to permit recovery by the patient, but not to prevent
liability by the physician. It's validity, therefore, is questionable on those grounds alone. I submit the concept ought to be
disregarded in its entirety, for it is patently obvious that the
requisites of a contract are not present.
III. TREATMENT OTHER THAN AUTHORIZED

A. GENERAL--Liability for treatment without consent accrues when the treatment administered is different from or
in excess of the consent given, or involves risks and results not
anticipated. 33 The Restatement of Torts34 contends that consent to a particular operation does not authorize a surgeon
to perform another operation. It is of no consequence that another operation may be necessary to effect the patient's cure.
However, consent may be implied as the result of emergency.
25. See Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104,N.W. 12 (1905).
26. Rolater v. Strain, 38 Okla. 572, 137 Pac. 96 (1913).
27. Frank v. Malinlak, 232 App. Div. 278, 249 N.Y. Supp. 514 (1931).
28. Perry v. Hodgson, 168 Ga. 678, 148 S.E. 659 (1929).
29. Bishops v. Shurly, 237 Mich. 76, 211 N.W. 75 (1926). In re Dzwonkewicz's Estate, 231 Mich. 165, 203 N.W. 671 (1925).
30. See Bennan v. Parsonnet. 83 N.J.L. 20, 83 At]. 948 (1912).
31. Kennedy v. Parrott, 243 N.C. 355, 90 S.E.2d 754 (1956).
32.

Ibid.

33. Wall v. Brim, 138 P.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1943); In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d
673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942) (dicta); Rogers v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty
Co., 119 So. 2d 649, 650 (La. 1960): "The general rule prohibiting the performance of an operation without the consent of the patient extends to
the performance of operations different in nature from that for which
consent was given, and to operations involving risks and results not contemplated."
34. § 54, comment (a) at 104 (1934).
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In the absence of emergency or general authorization, there
is no justification for performing an operation not authorized. The physician may not substitute his judgment for that
of the patient in the absence of emergency.35 It does not matter that the operation has been performed with skill and care, 36
or in line with good surgery. 7 Prosser 3 suggests that the physician's "privilege" is limited to acts substantially similar in
nature to those authorized. Further, that the physician may
not exceed the consent actually given or reasonably to be
implied.
For example, a physician was held liable for a thigh oper9
ation to obtain tissue needed to remedy an injured finger.3
But in the extraction of a tooth causing the pain complained
of, although not authorized, recovery of damages was not al4
lowed. 0
Thus, liability has followed where an incision was made
deeper than agreed upon. 41 A contrary result was reached,
where an additional incision was found necessary to relieve
42
the condition complained of.
It appears that recovery for extension of an operation has
frequently been denied where it is necessary to relieve the patient of the ailment of which he has complained. Recovery
should be denied whenever the extended operation is of benefit to the patient, and when no detrimental results are experienced by him.
B. MISTAKEN IDENTITY--Occasionally mistake in the identity of a patient has led to the administration of treatment
not intended for the patient. In such cases liability has gen43
erally followed.
Patients usually do not understand the nature of the treatment to be given. Most patients have implicit confidence in
their physicians and questions by the patient are usually not
appropriate. Therefore, they cannot be considered to have consented when they acquiesce to treatment given where mis44
take exists.
35. Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960).
36. Supra note 30.
37. Franklyn v. Peabody, 249 Mich. 363, 228 N.W. 681 (1930).
38. PROSSER, TORTS § 18, at 84 (2d ed. 1955).
39. Supra note 40.
40. Doniger v. Berger, 241 App. Div. 23, 271 N.Y. Supp. 30 (1934).
41. Supra note 30.
42. Harrison v. Reed, 21 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 206, 29 O.D.N.P. 399 (1916).
43. Gill v. Selling, 125 Ore. 587, 267 Pac. 812 (1928); Samuelson v. Taylor,
160 Wash. 369, 295 Pac. 113 (1931).
44. Gill v. Selling, 125 Ore. 587, 267 Pac. 812 (1928).
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C. MISREPRESENTATION-Liability is incurred if consent
for treatment is obtained by representations which are false
to the knowledge of the physician. 45 However, the greater problem exists where sufficient information has not been given
the patient or, where information has not been conveyed in
an intelligible manner. It has been held that a physician violates his duty to his patient by withholding facts necessary to
form an intelligent consent.4 Thus, where alternative situations can be ascertained in advance of an operation and no
emergency exists, the patient should be so informed and given
7
an opportunity to decide before the operation.4
The rights of a patient when consulting a physician are the
right to "diagnosis, advice and consultation". Subsequently, it
is for the patient to determine whether treatment is to be administered.41 A substantial disclosure 49 or a previous full disclosure of implications and probable consequences of the proposed treatment must be given in terms which may be fully
comprehended by the patient.50 Thus, in a recent Kansas decision-' where radiation therapy was administered with the
patient's consent, nonetheless liability arose for injuries resulting. It was reasoned that the nature, risks and consequences of the treatment had not been properly explained.
The court further stated that the "informed consent" of the
patient must be obtained.52
However, complete diagnosis of an internal ailment can not
be made until an anesthetic has been administered and an
incision made. Therefore, it is unreasonable to hold a physician to the exact operation that his preliminary examination
3
indicated was necessary.
A greater need exists for informirng the patient of the nature, risks and consequences of proposed treatment. However,.
this is not intended to indicate the need for giving detailed
technical information. Nonetheless, where an internal operation is involved, both the consent and information relied upon
45. Birnbaum v. Siegler, 273 App. Div. 817, 76 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1948).
46. Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Bd. of Trust., 154 Cal. 2d
560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957).
47. Bang, v. Charles T. Miller Hospital, 251 Minn. 427, 88 N.W.2d 186,
(1958).
48. Parmley v. Parmley and Yule, 4 D.L.R. 81 (Can. Sup. Ct. 1945).
49. Supra note 38.
50. See Lacey v. Laird, 166 Ohio St. 12, 139 N.E.2d 25 (1956).
51. Supra note 38.
52. Ibid.
53. See Kennedy v. Parrott, 243 N.C. 355, 90 S.E.2d 754 (1956).
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for that consent should be interpreted in the light of conditions subsequently discovered by the physician.
D. SURGERY OR MAJOR OPERATION-Liability for remedying
the patient's ailment has been precluded where it is found nec54
essary to resort to surgery, to remove an object from the eye
or to reduce a fracture55 when authorized methods fail. But
liability will follow if a major operation has been preformed
and only a minor operation authorized, in absence of emergency.-8 If a diagnosis has been mistaken, the patient if conscious must be permitted to consent to a major operation in
the absence of emergency.5 7
If only an examination is authorized, liability may attach
when a physician performs an operation.5 8 Thus, although
a physician claimed the need for clipping tissue to determine a
patient's throat problem, liability can be incurred if such clip9
ping is contrary to instructions.5
E. REMOVAL OF PART OF THE BODY-Removal of a bone, although serving no useful function, 60 or removal of a glande1 is
not justified, in the absence of authorization. As to the contention that tonsils serve no useful purpose it has been declared:

The law presumes that every organ, including glands,
has some function to perform in maintaining the body in
sound health. The presumption is not overcome because
medical science has not yet ascertained the62 precise function performed by a specific organ or gland.
But, a recent Kentucky decision, 63 in dictum stated that removal of the appendix on the basis that it has no utility would
be permissible without consent.
A patient is entitled to limit his consent to an operation
reasonably appropriate to relieve him of his condition.6 4 Thus,
the removal of an organ is actionable unless, in the course of
authorized surgery a condition arises requiring further surgery.6 5 But an emergency together with a general consent
54. Adams v. Boyce, 37 Cal. 2d 541, 99 P.2d 1044 (1940).
55. McGuire v. Rix, 118 Neb. 434, 225 N.W. 120 (1929).
56. Paulsen v. Gundersen, 218 Wis. 578, 260 N.W. 448 (1935).
57. Wall v. Brim 138 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1943).
58. See e. g., Physicians' and Dentists' Business Bureau v. Duray,
Wash. 2d 38, 111 P.2d 568 (1941).
59. See Marshall v. Harter, 262 S.W.2d 180 (Ky 1953).
60. Supra note 28.
61. See Reddington v. Clayman, 334 Mass. 244, 134 N.E.2d 92b (1956).
62. Hively v. Higgs, 120 Ore. 588, 253 Pac. 363 (1927).
63. Nolan v. Kechijian, 75 R.I. 165, 64 A.2d 866 (1949).
64. Valdez v. Percy, 35 Cal. App. 2d 485, 96 P.2d 142 (1939).
65. Wheeler v. Barker, 92 Cal. 2d 68, 208 P.2d 68 (1949).

8
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form has prevented recovery for removal of the uterus, although authorization for removal only of a tumor attached
thereto was given.66
No liability should follow the removal of a gland or organ
where there is medical justification, as long as it is not injurious to the patient. However, such removal on the basis
of lack of utility is not justified.
F. UNRELATED CONDITIONS-Frequently the problem of
correcting an unrelated condition discovered during the course
of authorized surgery arises. Here it is apparently the duty
of a surgeon to perform such operation as good surgery demands, although extending the operation further than originally contemplated. This has permitted removal of an acute appendix during an operation for other purposes,67 and removal
of diseased fallopian tubes during an operation to remedy a
problem of recurring miscarriages6s No liability has resulted
for puncturing cysts during an appendectomy on the ground
that no express limitation had been placed on the physician.6 9
But in the absence of emergency or a condition affecting the
patient's life or health, tying off the fallopian tubes created
a liability when done without the patient's express consent.7 0
The fact that it would have been necessary to remove such
organs within six months has been found to be insufficient
1
j ustification.7
A recent California decision72 has developed a unique rule
for the problem of unrelated conditions. There it was held,
that if conditions should be discovered that could not reasonably have been anticipated before the operation was commenced, which if postponed would involve pain and distress out of
proportion to the risk of a new operation, then the physician
is justified in extending the operation. A further stipulation
is that the condition must be such that a reasonable man
would consent to the operation if he knew of the condition.73
The rule which requires correcting an, unrelated condition
only on the basis of an emergency of safeguarding the patient's life, health or safety should be the only valid reason
66.
67.
68.
69.

Tabor v. Scobee, 254 S.W.2d 474 (Ky. 1952).
Barnett v. Bachrach, 34 A.2d 626 (App. D.C. 1943).
King v. Carney, 85 Okla. 62, 204 Pac. 270 (1922).
Supra note

33.

70.
71.
72.

Murray v. McMurchy, 2 D.L.R. 442 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1949).
See Tabor v. Scobee, 254 S.E.2d 474 (Ky. 1952).
Danielson v. Roche, 109 Cal. 2d 832, 241 P.2d 1028 (1952).

73.

Ibid.
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for an extension. In addition, there should be no liability where
the extended operation resulted in a benefit to the patient or
where no injuries were sustained by him as a result thereof.
The view which considers the risk of a new operation in relation to the pain and distress arising out of a postponement
has a great deal of merit.
G. INJURIES FROM AUTHORIZED TREATMENT-Occasionally

performing authorized treatment, injuries occur which the
physician seeks to remedy. It has been argued that reopening
an incision to recover a needle does not constitute a separate
and independent operation, but is incidental to and a part of
the main one.7 4 Repairing a fractured jaw as a result of extracting a tooth was held to preclude liability. The reason for
not finding liability was the existence of implied consent and
the necessity for prompt action.15 However, another court has
held a second operation performed for the purpose of remedying mistakes made in the first operation not justified, for no
emergency existed and the patient could have been consulted.76
On the other hand no liability exists where surgery has not
been undertaken to the extent authorized. The reason offered is that the authority to operate carries with it the implied
authority not to do so when death would be the most probable
result.7 7 The Restatement of Torts7 8 substantiates this in stating that assent to a serious invasion of the person includes
assent to a lesser invasion.
There should be no liability for remedying a condition which
is a direct result of authorized treatment, nor where an emergency exists, with no opportunity to Gbtain consent.
IV. CONCLUSION
Greater flexibility in the application of the general consent
rule appears desirable. A strict application of the consent rule
might often result in a person requiring assistance to be left
unattended, ' 9 and a loss of many lives which might otherwise
be saved. 0 More latitude in exercising their judgment should
be granted physicians and surgeons. Under modern conditions,
74.
75.
76.
77.

78.
79.
80.

Higley v. Jeffrey, 44 Wyo. 37, 8 P.2d 96 (1932).
Preston v. Hubbell, 87 Cal. 2d 53. 196 P.2d 113 (1948).
Gist v. French, 136 Cal. 2d 247, 288 P.2d 1003 (1955).
Huttner v. MacKay, 48 Wash. 2d 378, 293 P.2d 766 (1956).

§ 54, comment (a) at 104 (1934).
See Chambers v. Nottebaum, 96 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 1957).
Luka v. Lowrie, 171 Mich. 122, 136 N.W. 1106 (1912) (dictum).
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rules of conduct for trained physicians and surgeons should
be fixed to reasonably fit conditions. Physicians must be permitted to exercise their professional judgment as to the necessity for treatment without waiting for the consent ordinarily
required."' Otherwise, the skilled hand of an expert will be
stayed by an unreasonable rule, not only detrimental to the
patient, but humanity at large.82
The concept of the physician as the legal representative of
the patient, the general authorization, and the implication of
consent, should be discarded. Perhaps even the concepts relating to emergencies and unanticipated conditions ought to be
discarded in favor of a more flexible and broader rule. Such
rule might be framed on the basis of a "reasonable man" test
and could include the viewpoint of both the layman and the
medical man. A suggested rule, for situations where actual
consent is not feasible might be as follows:
In all circumstances except where there exists an express consent, a physician or surgeon confronted with the
treatment of, or an operation upon a patient is not to be
found liable for performing such treatment where the
circumstances are such that a reasonable man would consent thereto if he were aware of the condition, and where
a reasonable physician or surgeon would perform the
treatment.
The rule submitted above would provide the courts with
more of the flexibility needed to do justice to all parties. It
would give the physician or surgeon Pecessary latitude within which to administer treatment with the view of sustaining and safeguarding lives. Finally, it would safeguard the
rights of the patient in the preservation and security of his
body.

81.
82.

Supra note 62 (dictum).
Jackovach v. Yocum, 212 Iowa 914, 237 N.W. 444 (1931)

(dictum).

